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GLOBAL ARAB WORLD MIGRATIONS 
AND DIASPORAS
Louise Cainkar
Louise Cainkar is Associate Professor of Sociology and Social Welfare and 
Justice at Marquette University.
 Don’t live in the world as if you were renting or here only for the summer, 
but act as if it was your [mother’s] house. 
—Nazim Hikmet 
!is article provides a comprehensive overview of the quantitative dimen-
sions of contemporary Arab world migrations and diasporas, as well as 
a commentary on qualitative dimensions of pertinent English-language 
scholarship.1 It o"ers a global context within which scholars may situate 
their work in order to enhance communication and comparability across 
scholarly disciplines and regions. Scholars who study Arab world migra-
tions and diasporas in Europe are not o#en in conversation with those 
studying these migrations and diasporas in North America or in the Gulf 
states. !e same can be said for scholars who study Arab world migra-
tions and diasporas in Malaysia, China, or Australia, as well as South 
America, Africa, or the Caribbean. Similarly, scholars approaching these 
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topics from the paradigms of postcolonial theory, anthropology, cultural 
studies, demography, history, comparative literature, or sociology do not 
o!en enough engage relevant scholarship outside of their paradigm. Only 
occasionally do scholars of di"erent disciplines gather together to present 
their work at scholarly meetings, and even then we seem to speak di"erent 
languages.2 Disciplinary di"erences are healthy and important for the range 
of perspectives they contribute, but an overarching framework—such as 
the one o"ered here—will better enable us to make comparisons across 
place, time, and social contexts, and to deploy our conceptual categories 
“in a relational manner.”3  
Developing such an overview of current Arab migrations and dias-
poras requires acknowledging the serious limitations inherent to the task. 
Demographic data are always subject to both random and systematic error; 
accuracy in migrant demography is especially elusive. Terminology and 
measurement tools vary according to who is doing the counting and how 
they construct their categories. Since demography is always connected to 
place, dominant ideologies, laws, categories, and nomenclatures where the 
counting occurs introduce variations. Demographic statistics speak to those 
who have been counted; there are many reasons why migrants might evade 
enumeration, for example, due to legal or political status.  Furthermore, in 
some enumerations persons born on a state’s soil are considered “foreign-born” 
if they maintain the nationality of their parents and have not naturalized, 
while other states may count them as “native-born.” #ese variations are 
tied to state ideologies of nation and citizenship and corresponding rules 
concerning naturalization (where available), thus making it di$cult to 
compare quantitatively across sites. 
#e numbers provided in this article can o"er a general framework for 
understanding the breadth and character of Arab world migrations and 
diasporas today. However, it is incumbent on specialists of each migrant 
location to do the tough investigative work needed for quantitative precision 
and comparability, including revealing those who are uncounted. Finally, 
demographic data on migrants tend to be organized by country of birth, 
potentially masking meaningful distinctions between di"erent groups 
from the same country of origin. Although the data presented here were 
tabulated and published (by others) as Arab migration data, I use the term 
“Arab world migration” to highlight that we are not necessarily describing 
cultural or ethnic groups, but people who come from a particular place. 
Louise Cainkar
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!ere are many indigenous and diasporic peoples living in, moving through, 
and leaving the Arab world who are not “Arabs,” such as Berbers, Kurds, 
Armenians, Assyrians, and Circassians, to name a few. 
In the process of searching for comparable quantitative data, I discovered 
that categories of quanti"cation have a reifying tendency that has infected 
our qualitative research as well. !ese categories direct our gaze in speci"c 
ways that cause us to highlight certain matters while overlooking others, 
creating an overall imbalanced body of scholarly literature on Arab world 
migrations and diasporas. !is imbalance is particularly notable when one 
compares the English-language scholarly literature on Arab world migrants 
living within the Arab world to that on Arab world migrants living outside of 
it. In the case of the former, the dominant focus is on state policies, occupa-
tions, labor conditions, and remittances while the latter tends to emphasize 
social, cultural, and political struggles, adaptations, constructed memories, 
and hybridities. !is pattern of scholarship might make sense if we believe 
that o#cial categories of migrants should drive our intellectual curiosities, 
but my argument is that when we do so, we miss a lot.
Categories and Paradigms
Although migration is a perennial human phenomenon, it was not system-
atically and globally tabulated until the twentieth century. !is era was 
characterized by decolonization and the creation of scores of formally and 
o$en arbitrarily bounded nation-states; global wars and mass movements 
of displaced persons; the formation of the United Nations and its a#liated 
agencies; the development of and implementation of rules concerning 
identity cards, o#cial travel documents, and visas, with corresponding 
intra- and inter-state controls on human movement; and the construction 
of technical categorizations of people in motion. Akin to the development 
processes of earlier nation-states, new ruling powers and dominant groups 
de"ned the boundaries of human membership in the state—conferring or 
denying legal, social, and cultural citizenship—and constructing imaginaries 
of national identity intended to supersede all other identities. !ey thereby 
created and solidi"ed socially constructed distinctions between insiders 
and outsiders. Over time, international organizations and state authorities 
developed technical categories to distinguish between types of migrants, 
and then scholars increasingly referred to international migrants by the 
categories the latter inhabited. !ey made distinctions between permanent 
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and temporary, forced and voluntary, refugee and asylee, documented and 
undocumented, labor migrant, student migrant, family migrant, guest, alien, 
tourist, resident, and citizen. !ese categorizations, however, obscured 
migrants’ shared qualities. 
!e quantitative overview of current Arab world migrations and dias-
poras presented here utilizes the broad UN de"nition of “migrant”—“any 
person who changes his or her country of usual residence” (usually excluding 
visitors, business travelers, and students, among others). !e qualitative 
discussion also eschews the technical subcategories in order to highlight 
how the rei"cation of categories operates in scholarly work. We do risk 
displacing some important speci"cities in the process, something Shami 
has called “erasure through inclusion” when discussing the anthropological 
treatment of the refugee in the transnational paradigm: 
Just like everyone else, if more so, the refugee is mobile, uprooted, 
dislocated, and lonely. . . . [T]he refugee is simply one of many who 
travel this landscape, together with tourists, guest workers, exiles, 
business consultants, expatriate experts, roving academics, and the 
like. !e fact that the refugee appears as a term couched between 
other terms of mobile existence is erasure through inclusion.4
Yet if my objective is developing an overarching framework that will 
allow us to make comparisons across place, time, and social context, I believe 
distinctions should at least initially be le# behind. Diaspora studies scholars 
similarly engage in collapsing categories when they treat multiple generations 
as a single transnational unit, since the diasporic subject is de"ned not by 
physical movement per se but by identi"cation with and social and emotional 
ties to the homeland.5 For example, Safran’s framework for a diaspora’s 
de"ning characteristics include: dispersion from an original center, collec-
tive memory of homeland, social distance from the host society, communally 
shared hope for return, and solidarity around commitment to building the 
homeland.6 Ho’s work takes a di$erent angle all together, demonstrating 
how “absence shapes the diasporic experience. . . . To be in one place is to be 
absent everywhere else.”7 Sociologists who focus on “transnational social 
"elds”8 o#en collapse subject categories in favor of networks and linkages 
while sociologists interested in the relationship between identity and culture 
consider it important to distinguish between migrant generations. !ey 
assert that persons who have le# their homelands as adults have qualita-
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tively di!erent experiences from those born in the “host” country, and the 
experiences of subsequent generations are in turn di!erent from both of 
the aforementioned groups.9 Brubaker believes that the diaspora concept 
has been deployed too broadly, as it has been applied “essentially to any 
and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed 
in space.” For him, the concept loses its meaning when groups like “labour 
migrants who maintain (to some degree) emotional and social ties with a 
homeland,”10 are captured within it. 
While these theoretical and conceptual discussions and debates are 
important for re"ning our scholarly work, they do not bring us closer to a 
comprehensive and comparative overview in which to situate it. Being clear 
about whom we are speaking is crucial to our ability to make global and 
cross-cultural comparisons; the danger comes when categories become rei"ed 
and the shared qualities of migrants are obscured. When o#cial statuses 
and state policies shape the parameters of our research queries—instead 
of being viewed as the producers of variation that they are—questions are 
asked about one migrant type that are not asked of another. In fact, every 
categorical type and every generation of migrant, and non-migrants alike, 
makes similar demands of their social conditions, the minimum of which 
is human dignity. Although our perspectives and conceptual schemes 
may di!er, much of our scholarly work on the Arab migrant and diasporic 
subject shares a qualitative theme or problematic rooted in the concept of 
human dignity, and it is through this commonality that we can engage each 
other’s work. It is this very dignity that most o$en eludes migrants when 
they take on the status of stranger. Nazim Hikmet’s poetic call to live as if 
at home, and not a visitor, crystallizes a key challenge for migrants of any 
generation: "nding dignity, security, solace, rootedness, and happiness 
outside one’s symbolic “mother’s house,” is especially di#cult when one is 
seen by others as temporary, merely a renter. 
Human Dignity
%e concept of human dignity can encompass most of our disciplinary 
concerns and provide a framework for cross-disciplinary communica-
tion. Economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum de"ne 
human dignity as the ability to act on one’s human capabilities. It lies in 
possessing the agency to express oneself politically, civilly, socially, and 
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culturally without arbitrary encumbrances or economic barriers.11 !e 
cra"ers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as scholars 
such as Karl Marx recognized human dignity as the fundamental concept 
undergirding human rights and equality. Journalist Anthony Shadid, at 
the height of the Egyptian uprising, articulated dignity as the opposite of 
humiliation and hopelessness, something denied when the pursuit of one’s 
most basic dreams has been circumscribed: 
“Dignity” (karamah) was a word o"en used Wednesday [2 February 
2011], and its emphasis underlined the breadth of a movement that is, 
so far, leaderless. Neither the Brotherhood nor a handful of opposition 
leaders—men like Mohammed ElBaradei or Ayman Nour—have 
managed to articulate hopelessness, the humiliations at the hands of 
the police and the outrage at having too little money to marry, echoed 
in the streets of Palestinian camps in Jordan and in the urban misery 
of Baghdad’s Sadr City.12 
Human dignity is a useful overarching term because it does not distin-
guish between colonial, postcolonial, diasporic, or transnational subjects. 
It does not distinguish between migrant and non-migrant, documented or 
undocumented migrant, #rst- or second-generation migrant, voluntary or 
forced migrant, labor or family migrant, permanent or temporary migrant. 
A digni#ed state of being might be considered the opposite of otherness, a 
social position that conscribes agency and allows the powerful to commit 
acts of degradation. Dignity includes being able to live in a place where 
no one feels free to spit on you or to call your children terrorists. Dignity 
precludes distributing civil and political rights according to a dress code, 
preferred language, socioeconomic status, or hegemonic lifestyle.
Human dignity transcends borders, but when borders become sites of 
exclusion, dignity is one of the #rst sites of battle. Migrants of any type and 
all generations seek a life of dignity and the freedom to construct a world 
that o$ers a sense of safety, some of the comforts of the familiar, the chance 
to provide life’s fundamental necessities for self and others, and access to 
the resources to advance their capabilities. Yet they o"en discover a world 
of boundaries and exclusions, a condition that may hold true whether they 
are o%cially welcomed or spurned, temporary or permanent, an immigrant, 
refugee, asylee, or guest worker, and whether they are wealthy, middle-class, 
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or poor. Although !nancial resources can surely help to ease some of the pain 
and disruptions caused by the migratory experience, dignity is something 
that cannot be purchased. Indeed, the migrant’s quest for human dignity 
is di"erent only in context from that of every human being.
One way of thinking about human dignity and its relationship to migra-
tions and diasporas within and outside of the Arab world is to cast o" ana-
lytic, conceptual, and technical categories of migrations and diasporas and 
think instead of migration and the popular revolutions that have occurred 
across the Arab world (o#en referred to as “the Arab Spring”) as two sides 
of the same coin. Migration and revolution are acts of human agency that 
demand more. Both emerge from discontent with authoritarianism, cor-
ruption, blocked aspirations, obstructed possibilities, and social inequali-
ties, and the loss of a sense of agency that accompanies these conditions. 
Neither migration nor revolution is principally a response to poverty, even 
though high levels of it may be present. Indeed, research shows that it is 
not the poorest members of any society that are likely to lead revolutions 
or to migrate, in part because of the greater damage done to their agency. 
Only at poignant, some call them epic, historic moments do sweeping waves 
of popular rebellions such as “the Arab Spring” occur. Migration, on the 
other hand, is a type of unremitting human rebellion. It is the perennial 
and persistent, indeed unstoppable, human quest for dignity and autonomy. 
While the place in which the migrant lands, the way in which s/he arrives, 
and the paperwork s/he carries may determine his or her category as a 
migrant, the quest of all migrants is the same. 
Arab World Defined
In contemporary usage, “the Arab world” de!nes the territories of the 
twenty-two members of the League of Arab States, with a population of 
some 318.5 million persons.13 Members include: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Scholars o#en describe these areas regionally, 
using the concepts Arab Maghrib, Arab Mashriq, and the Gulf states. $e 
Arab Maghrib (west) is commonly understood as composed of Morocco, 
Western Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya. $e Arab Mashriq 
(east) is understood as composed of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, 
and Yemen, and on occasion Egypt. Scholars o#en refer to the Levant (or 
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eastern Mediterranean), a place of signi!cant historic emigration, politically 
organized under the Ottoman Empire as Bilad al-Sham or Greater Syria, 
including contemporary Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and historic Palestine. "e 
Gulf states are the Arab states on the Arabian Peninsula save Yemen, and 
are synonymous with the current members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Scholars deploy other geographic terms including North Africa (the 
Arab Maghrib plus Egypt and Sudan), the “Middle East” (the Arab Mashriq, 
GCC, and Israel and o#en encompassing a larger area that is not solely Arab), 
and the Horn of Africa (Somalia and Djibouti, as well as non-Arab League 
members Eritrea and Ethiopia). "e Comoros Islands are situated o$ the 
southeast coast of Africa. Scholars may critique the composition of each 
of these geographic categories because they are social constructions that 
rely on assumptions about the salient meaning of particular histories and 
features. In particular, “the Middle East” is a highly problematic category 
because its de!nition and scope vary widely, usually based on criteria of 
importance to external actors and interests. Furthermore, the political/ter-
ritorial boundaries of all of these nation-states were socially and in many 
cases arbitrarily constructed, largely by colonial powers.  
With regard to major migration patterns, some of these countries are 
migrant-exporting states while others are migrant-importing states. "e 
countries with relatively high rates of emigration are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen. "e GCC states and Libya (until 2012) are major migrant importing 
states. "e terminology I use in this article is largely that of data collectors 
and demographic analysts and is clearly de!ned in its context. 
Arab World Migration Overview
Globally some 214 million people lived as international migrants—persons 
who have changed their country of usual residence—in 2010. "is is about 
3.1 percent of the world’s population or one of every thirty-two persons.14 
"e geographic spread of these migrants is wider than at any prior historical 
time and the value of their remittances has increased exponentially over the 
past few decades. A range of new and old factors shape the movement pat-
terns of today’s international migrants: geographic proximity, concerns for 
safety, historic economic relationships, state policies, political and economic 
conditions, family reuni!cation, natural disasters, war, social networks, 
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knowledge of work opportunities, availability of visas, international agen-
cies, labor recruiters, and human tra!ckers. Some four percent of persons 
originating in an Arab state are international migrants including, most 
notably, one of every thirteen Lebanese.15 
Table 1: Current International Migrants from the Arab World
Compiled by Louise Cainkar from comparable sources. 
a International Organization of Migration, “Intra-Regional Labour Mobility in the Arab World
Facts and Figures, Cairo.” Development Research Centre, Global Migrant Origin Database, 
Updated March 2007. http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_
migrant_origin_database.html [2000 census data. Foreign born.]
b Ibid.
c Jean-Christophe Dumont, Immigrants from Arab Countries to the OECD: From the Past to the 
Future. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in 
the Arab Region, 2006. UN/POP/EGM/2006/11.
d Ibid.
Of the estimated thirteen million current Arab world international 
migrants, "#y-"ve percent (7.15 million) live outside of the Arab world.16 
$ey are signi"cantly concentrated in the western European and North 
American countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).17 $e remaining forty-"ve percent (5.85 million) 
live in the Arab world.18 Nearly seventy percent of migrants from the Arab 
Maghrib live in Europe, although some one million of them live in other 
Arab countries.19 On the other hand, nearly seventy percent of migrants from 
the Arab Mashriq (which the IOM de"nes as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Yemen) live in the Arab 
world, mostly in GCC countries.20  
Estimated Total Proportion of Current 
Arab World Migrants
Current Arab World Migrantsa 13 million
Inside the Arab Worldb 5.85 million 45 percent
Outside the Arab Worldc 7.15 million 55 percent
OECD Countriesd 4.9 million 38 percent
In France 2.3 million
In “Countries of Immigration” 980,000 
Rest of World 2.3 million 18 percent
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!e term “current” used here is slightly misleading and highlights 
some of the problems with quantitative data on migrant populations. !ere 
are plenty of statistics available on international migrants from a range of 
sources. However, few of these are comparable across time and place. !e 
data that are comparable, because they are based on similar de"nitions 
and sources, are from the OECD, the UN, or the Development Research 
Centre’s Global Migrant Origin database. While publications may use the 
term “current migrants” in a 2006 or 2010 report, all of these reports draw 
their data from information collected on “immigrant stocks” (foreign-
born) in national censuses conducted around the year 2000.21 Certainly, 
these data must be treated with skepticism, as they are subject to the errors 
common to censuses and to statistics on migrants. However, until we have 
better comparable data, this information can provide us with a sense of the 
proportion, range, and variation of Arab world migrations and diasporas.22 
Arab World Migrations and Diasporas Outside the Arab 
World: Demographic and Social Parameters
Fi#y-"ve percent of current international migrants from the Arab world live 
outside of the region; the majority live in Europe, and some sixty percent 
live in the developed market economies of the OECD countries. Nearly half 
of all Arab world migrants in OECD countries live in France (2.3 million 
in 2000, or forty-eight percent) while the second largest group lives in the 
United States, but at a rate four times lower than in France, 11.6 percent.23 
!e following countries were home to ninety percent of current migrants 
from Arab countries living in the OECD (in descending order): France, the 
United States, Spain, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Sweden, and Belgium. Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians were 
fully seventy percent of Arab world migrants in OECD countries, while 
another twenty percent were Iraqis, Egyptians, and Lebanese.24 Dumont 
predicted in 2006 that if current trends continued, Moroccans would be 
one out of two Arab world migrants in the OECD by 2010.25 !e majority of 
Arab world migrants to OECD countries are men. However, women from 
the Arab world have migrated to these countries at substantially higher 
rates than to other Arab countries.26 While nearly half of all Algerian and 
Libyan migrants were female (the global norm is forty-nine percent), the 
gendered migration rates for other Arab countries ranged from thirty to 
forty-seven percent female. At the lower end of the scale, women were less 
than forty percent of migrants over age "#een from Jordan, Oman, the 
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Palestinian territories, Yemen, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Data on 
self-identi!ed Arabs living in the United States (native- and foreign-born) 
also show striking gender imbalances: !"y-seven percent of them are male, 
and nearly seventy percent are male in the thirty-!ve to thirty-nine age 
group. #ese imbalances do not even out until a"er the age of sixty-four.27
Striking differences in socio-political context and socioeconomic 
characteristics emerge when the dominant trends for Arab world migrants 
living in Europe are compared to those living in the OECD “countries of 
immigration”—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
#ese di$erences include migration history, state ideology, immigration 
policies, place of origin, human capital, employment, proportionate share 
of the population, and naturalization rates. #ese dissimilarities must 
certainly matter to the qualitative experiences of these migrants, but we 
have not done su%cient comparative work to specify precisely how they 
matter. At the same time, there are some overarching similarities across 
these countries that have increased in momentum over the past decade. I 
provide broad outlines of these di$erences and similarities below in an 
e$ort to encourage more comparative thinking among scholars of Arab 
world migrations and diasporas. 
Arab world migration to Europe is a predominantly although not 
exclusively postcolonial movement from the Maghrib, which has shaped 
the sociopolitical conditions in which these migrants live. Significant 
exceptions to this pattern include Yemeni and Somali migrations to the 
United Kingdom, Lebanese migrations to France, and Arab refugee reset-
tlements in Scandinavia. Maghribi men and women moved north across 
the Mediterranean in large numbers prior to and a"er World War II, when 
they were recruited as “guest workers.”28 #eir days as colonial subjects 
still fresh, they took up social positions in their new countries of residence 
as workers who were o$ered a lesser set of rights than citizens. A"er the 
1973 oil embargo and rising fuel prices, the demand for workers in Europe 
fell substantially (as it simultaneously increased in GCC countries). New 
immigration policies across Europe prioritized family reuni!cation over 
importing workers, although in the context of widely varying and o"en quite 
restrictive citizenship and naturalization policies, none of which included 
birthright citizenship (jus soli).29 Indeed, statistics on these groups need 
to be examined deeply due to varying and shi"ing policies concerning 
naturalization and citizenship. For example, one must attend to whether 
statistics on “Moroccans” apply only to the foreign-born or to multiple 
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generations, including the native-born lacking citizenship.30 Master nar-
ratives in the dominant cultures of most European states continued to 
maintain a colonial !avor that included racialized notions of Arab and 
Muslim inferiority. State actors and citizens used these to justify the con-
tinuing social, cultural, civic, and political exclusion of these populations. 
Unmet expectations that migrants and their children should assimilate to 
the dominant culture bolstered their claims that these “newcomers” are 
unwilling to integrate socially and “"t in.” 
Current Arab migration to the so-called OECD “countries of immigra-
tion”—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—is relatively 
small when compared to migration to Europe and within the Arab world. 
For example, statistics from 2000 placed the total number of migrants from 
the Arab world in all of these countries combined at about 983,000, or less 
then half the number in France alone.31 #e ideological context for Arab 
migrants living in the “countries of immigration” is qualitatively di$erent 
from that of Europe. In the former, population replacement (instead of 
work) guided by the racial ideology of white superiority was integral to 
their settler-colonial foundation. State policies promoted the aggressive 
replacement of indigenous populations through isolation and erasure, on 
the one hand, and open door in-migration for individual and family “white” 
migrants on the other. Perquisites o$ered initially only to “whites” included 
both naturalized and birthright (jus soli) citizenship, as well as scores of 
additional privileges, such as voting, legal, and homesteading rights.32 
For these reasons, Arab migrants’ experiences were deeply in!uenced by 
whether they were considered white or not (and this varied) by their new 
host countries. Over time, racialized ideas have lessened their grip on 
immigration and naturalization policies in these countries. At the same 
time, birthright citizenship has been revoked in Australia (as of 1986, it is 
acquired on the tenth birthday of a child born in Australia regardless of the 
parents’ citizenship status) and New Zealand (as of 2006 at least one parent 
must be a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident). 
#ese “countries of immigration” have more recently recon"gured 
their dominant ideologies to de"ne and promote themselves as sites of 
ingathering for multiple ethnic groups, cultures, and races, and have more 
accessible naturalization policies than in Europe. #e context of reception 
for migrants in these countries has been strikingly di$erent from that in 
Europe, particularly in economic and cultural domains.33 Although each 
of these states has a dominant white Christian culture that migrants are 
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expected to admire and emulate, a continuum of hybrid and resistance 
cultures seems to be more socially tolerated in these places, ideologically at 
least, and especially in urban areas.34 So while notions of “race” and ideas 
around membership and belonging matter signi!cantly in both European 
countries and the countries of immigration, how they matter and how 
they manifest themselves in daily life appear to vary—or do they? More 
comparative research is needed to tease out the similarities and di"erences 
across these regions. General indications are that Arab migrants overall fare 
better economically in the countries of immigration, but questions remain 
as to how much this economic success matters to social and political status. 
Does economic strength translate into any kind of power? And if not, why?
#e demographic pro!le of migrants from the Arab world living in 
the “countries of immigration” is quite di"erent from that of those living 
in Europe in terms of countries of origin and human capital (education 
and skills). In the former, they are more likely to be from the Mashriq, 
especially Lebanon and Egypt, followed by Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, than 
from Maghribi countries. An exception is Canada, where migrants from 
Morocco and Algeria make up about ten percent of the Arab origin popula-
tion (native- and foreign-born). #ey are characterized by neither a post-
colonial relationship nor a historic guest worker status. Overall, migrants 
from the Arab world in the above four countries are more likely to be 
skilled, highly educated, and actively employed than those living in Europe, 
especially in European countries where they have a longer history, such as 
France and Belgium.35 For example, eighty-four percent of self-identi!ed 
Arabs (native- and foreign-born) ages twenty-!ve and older in the United 
States had a high school diploma (higher than the overall US population, at 
eighty percent). Forty-one percent had at least a bachelor’s degree, signi!-
cantly higher than that of the US population overall (twenty-four percent), 
a !gure that bears out for each individual Arab country of origin group.36 
Similarly, Canadians of Arab origin (native- and foreign-born) were twice 
as likely as other Canadians to have completed a university degree (thirty 
percent compared to !$een percent) and to hold a graduate degree.37 On 
the other hand, migrants from the Maghrib to the OECD countries, the 
overwhelming majority of whom are in Europe, show much lower levels of 
human capital.38 Some sixty-three percent of migrants from Morocco, and 
!$y-six percent from Algeria and Tunisia, have not completed a high school 
education and less than twenty percent of each group has had at least two 
years of college education.39  
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Labor force participation rates show some signi!cant di"erences when 
comparing the longer established Maghribi communities in Europe with 
more recent Arab migrants in the countries of immigration. #e labor force 
participation rate of Moroccans (foreign-born and native-born without 
citizenship) in Belgium was thirty-!ve percent overall and fourteen percent 
for women,40 as compared to seventy-one percent for Moroccan men and 
!$y-three percent for Moroccan women in the United States (foreign- and 
native-born), rates that were quite similar to the US population as a whole.41 
Among self-identi!ed Arabs in the United States aged sixteen and older, 
the labor force participation rate of men was higher than that of the total 
population (seventy-three percent compared with seventy-one percent) while 
the labor force participation rate of women was lower than for women in 
the total population (forty-six percent compared with !$y-eight percent). 
In Canada, people of Arab origin aged !$een and over are somewhat less 
likely to be employed than Canadians overall—!$y-six percent as compared 
to sixty-two percent of all Canadian adults—although this di"erence is 
mainly due to the lower labor force participation rates of Arab women.42 
It is generally true that people (including migrants) with higher skill 
and education levels (human capital) fare better economically, and this 
pattern holds true for Arab world migrants. Highly skilled Arab world 
migrants living in Europe do well, but the majority of them do not share 
this human capital pro!le.43 As a result of these di"erences in human capital 
and employment rates, Arab world migrants in Europe are far more likely to 
be low-income than those in the countries of immigration. #ese descrip-
tors, however, require a deeper examination of why these di"erences exist. 
What respective roles do immigration and naturalization policies, history, 
ideology, proximity, opportunity, segmented labor markets, and discrimi-
nation play in producing these outcomes? Despite some di"erences across 
Arab countries in terms of educational attainment, all Arab countries have 
populations with both high and low levels of education. #is indicates that 
social mobility in host countries is partly determined by immigration and 
recruitment policies, state ideologies, and employment and educational 
opportunities.44 
Another critical di"erence between Arab world migrants in Europe and 
the “countries of immigration” lies in their relative share of the population. 
In the latter, (self-identi!ed) foreign- and native-born Arabs combined 
constitute less than two percent of the population—less than one percent in 
the United States,45 and 1.2 percent in Canada and Australia—substantially 
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lower than the !gures for the Arab world foreign-born alone in a number of 
European countries.46 Persons from Arab countries are a signi!cant propor-
tion of the foreign-born in the following European countries: forty percent 
in France, sixteen percent in Spain, fourteen percent in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Italy, twelve percent in Denmark, and eleven percent in 
Sweden.47 Additionally, the overwhelming majority of Arab world migrants 
in Europe are Muslim, while Christians are a substantial proportion of Arab 
world migrants in the countries of immigration. Social research tells us that 
a potentially toxic combination emerges when signi!cant demographic 
proportions (the sociological “tipping point”), low incomes, and negative 
social constructions of a group intersect. Communities characterized by 
these features tend to become concentrated in urban ghettoes, locked out 
of upward mobility, and socially crystallized as the other, conditions that 
supply more traction to the notion that they pose a “cultural threat” to 
established communities and ways of life. "ese overall demographic dif-
ferences in proportion of the population, income, educational attainment, 
and labor force participation between Arab world migrants in Europe and 
in the countries of immigration—holding constant prejudice, racism, and 
Islamophobia—render their ghettoization, social exclusion, and downward 
mobility more likely in Europe and their capacities to resist negative treat-
ment lower.48 Even so, the body of social research tells us that communities 
stand up to these degradations and assert their dignity, that they create 
cultures of resistance, and that an ensuing two-way dialectic of rejection 
and acceptance ebbs and #ows according to broader social pressures.
Finally, migrants from the Arab world in the “countries of immigration” 
are more likely to obtain naturalized citizenship and to have political rights 
than those living in European countries, where naturalization policies are 
generally more limiting.49 For example, seventy-!ve percent of persons in 
the United States who self-identi!ed as Arabs were US citizens: forty-six 
percent of these were native-born (either in the United States or abroad to 
US citizen parents) and twenty-eight percent were Arab world foreign-born 
(2000 data). More than half of the foreign-born Arabs were naturalized 
citizens, a higher proportion than the overall US foreign-born population, 
for whom forty percent were naturalized citizens.50 More telling, the Arab 
groups with large proportions of non-citizens—Iraqis and Moroccans 
at forty-!ve percent—were also the most likely to be recent immigrants, 
implying that naturalization is only a matter of time. In comparison, only 
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about twenty-seven percent of the foreign-born from Algeria, twenty-six 
percent from Morocco, and forty percent from Tunisia have French citizen-
ship, while these !gures are higher for Lebanese, Syrians, and Egyptians.51 
"e increasingly restrictive naturalization policies of many European states, 
o#en tied to proof of language acquisition and cultural assimilation, suggest 
that migrants and their children in these places are required to choose 
between mirroring the dominant culture or accepting a lesser social and 
political status.
"e signi!cant di$erences between Europe and the “countries of immi-
gration” in social context and socioeconomic and political characteristics of 
migrants are highly likely to matter to the qualitative experiences of Arab 
migrants and their children. However, researchers can only specify the ways 
in which they matter when they do the comparative work the task requires. 
In addition, there are likely to be meaningful di$erences across these coun-
tries; the master categories of “Europe” and “countries of immigration” are 
helpful for analysis yet obscure internal variations. "ese di$erences aside, 
all of the countries discussed above as dominant locations of migrations 
outside of the Arab world share the phenomena of heightened anti-Arab 
racism and anti-Muslim social agitation.52 
As activists who are proponents of hostile attitudes toward Arabs and 
Muslims increasingly connect globally, an unsettling similarity is emerging 
across Europe and the “countries of immigration.” "is was evidenced in 
the United States, for example, at the 2011 King hearings in the US House 
of Representatives on whether native-born US Muslims are a source of 
threat, a topic long discussed in Europe. "us, although more likely to be 
economically successful, migrants from the Arab world in the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand share points of similarity with those in 
Europe, as well as other groups who sustain assaults on their human dignity 
in attempting to better their lives and feed their families. In other words, 
Arab world migrants in search of dignity, freedom, and opportunity !nd 
an array of shared social and political barriers and exclusions irrespective 
of varying state ideologies, policies, and opportunity structures. In the 
“countries of immigration,” they are more likely to !nd employment and 
educational opportunities, and to report that they !nd political freedom, 
but face a range of indignities tied to dominant understandings around 
race and anti-Muslim mobilizations.53 
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Nonetheless, return migration to the Arab world from all of these coun-
tries is relatively small, mainly due to the same reasons that launched the 
Arab uprisings: authoritarianism, corruption, blocked aspirations, obstructed 
possibilities, and social inequalities.54 Permanent return is replaced instead 
by life cycle stage-related circular migration and short-term visits to the 
homeland. !ese are the occasions when, beyond remittances and business 
ventures, migrants leave their strongest qualitative imprints on the nations 
they le", if only in the physical sense. Despite o"en hostile political condi-
tions and economic challenges, especially for low-skilled migrants, return 
rates are low. Skilled and unskilled migration from the Arab world to Europe 
continues, and is increasing sharply between Morocco and Italy and Spain 
(where labor force participation rates are higher).55 
Smaller Migrations
!ere are, of course, many other contemporary movements of persons from 
the Arab world to places outside of it, though smaller in volume than to 
the OECD countries discussed above. Some are ongoing movements that 
commenced decades or even centuries ago, some are emergent, some highly 
circular, and some short-term, provoked by crisis. According to the Global 
Migrant Origin Database of the Development Research Centre, these non-
OECD migrants represent about eighteen percent (2.3 million) of current 
Arab world migrants. Some prominent examples include Lebanese migra-
tions to Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, Yemeni migrations to Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Malaysia, Omani migrations to Zanzibar, and Lebanese, 
Syrian, and Palestinian migrations to Central and South America and 
the Caribbean. !ese migrations are not covered in detail in this section 
because the needed data are more di#cult to access, non-comparable, or 
based on unreliable estimates. While these movements are signi$cant for 
scholars, they are minor from the perspective of migration data collectors, 
who focus on the largest migrant groups in each state and on $rst-generation 
immigrants. For example, while Arab migrations to Latin America and the 
Caribbean are highly signi$cant for scholars, they are not even mentioned in 
reports on current migration patterns in these countries. !e same applies 
to reports on migration patterns within Africa, outside of North Africa.56 
While the relative size of current Arab world migrations may be small in 
these places (as compared to other migrating groups), this does not render 
these migratory movements qualitatively unimportant. In fact, they are quite 
signi$cant when one considers their longer history and their size—some 
143
Louise Cainkar
being quite large covering multiple generations—and their deeply transna-
tional character. Counting becomes more complicated in multi-generational 
diasporas. Many matters come into play, such as how second, third, and 
fourth generations identify themselves, and in the case, for example, of 
Arabs in Malaysia, how generations dating back centuries view themselves. 
Surely varying state ideologies and policies as well as historic patterns of 
assimilation, inter-marriage, resilience, exclusion, con!ict, nationalism, and 
transnationalism play a role in identity constructions and reconstructions. 
Since state policies and ideological dispositions toward internal population 
groups are interwoven with o"cial counting mechanisms,57 we need to 
discern how the state counts the descendants of immigrants—what ques-
tions does it ask? Due to these complexities and limitations with regard 
to quantitative data, I have placed discussion of these migrations in the 
“Diaspora” section below. 
#e diaspora perspective o$ers a wider lens than analyses of current 
migrations. It observes multiple generations and locations, just as the 
transnational perspective removes the %xity of assumptions of one-way 
migratory movement and permanently severed human relationships. Both 
of these perspectives have great potential to capture the complexities of 
human migration, especially how culture, state policies, and notions of 
home and belonging have intersected and changed over time. We know 
from a large body of research that the children of migrants born in the new 
place of residence (or migrating there by the mid-teens) develop social and 
psychological attachments to it—sometimes it is the only place they know 
well—even if they face discriminatory treatment.  #ey are far more likely 
than their migrating parents to learn the local language and adopt aspects 
of local culture, even when it is vastly di$erent from that of their parents, 
their parents disapprove, and they and their parents are denied member-
ship as citizens. Here, the complexities of hybridity, notions of home, and 
senses of belonging move to the forefront of qualitative scholarship. #e 
common preference of the children of migrants to stay in the countries where 
they were born or raised poses challenges to their identity constructions. 
Undoubtedly the vicissitudes of local context matter to this process. #is 
second-generation desire to stay creates additional tensions for migrants 
who want to return; doing so will likely split the family apart, repeating 
the pain of separation and the struggle of adjustment they experienced 
years back and separating the elderly from their caretaking o$spring. As 
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noted above, overall patterns show that Arab migrants residing outside of 
the Arab world have tended to remain outside, or to come and go. Surely 
economic reasons are not the sole factor in this pattern. 
In some places that Arab world migrants go, however, return is both 
the norm and the mandate. In these places, social and political membership 
are not even remote possibilities for migrants, who are informed a priori 
that there is no room to aspire for more than that what their visa or paper-
less status will allow.58 Here, human beings on the same quest for dignity, 
agency, and autonomy as all others are called labor migrants, contractual 
employees, or illegals. !e state and host citizenry treat them as persons 
whose needs are limited to a paycheck and whose capabilities can be justi"-
ably circumscribed, when the main way in which they are actually di#erent 
from other migrants is in their lesser set of civil, social, political, cultural, 
and economic rights. Here we turn to Arab world migrations and diasporas 
within the Arab world. I suggest that instead of speaking of “labor migrants” 
or “contract workers,” as is the common pattern, we should more accurately 
speak of labor migrant and contract worker states, for it is the state that 
de"nes the di#erence and not the migrant. 
Arab World Migrations and Diasporas within the Arab 
World: Demographic and Social Parameters
Migrant Worker States and Forced Displacements
Nearly half (forty-"ve percent or 5.8 million) of the current estimated thirteen 
million Arab migrants live in the Arab world, mostly in GCC countries,59 
but also increasingly in Jordan and Lebanon, according to the Development 
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty (2007 data).60 A 
majority of these migrants are from the Mashriq—here de"ned as Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen—
and Sudan, and a majority of Mashriq migrants live in Arab countries.61 
Egyptians comprised the numerically largest group: some seventy percent 
of the reported 2.7 million Egyptian migrants lived in Arab countries in 
2000, forty-eight percent of whom were in Saudi Arabia, twelve percent 
in Jordan, and two percent in Libya.62 A 1988 study found that Egyptian 
migrants living in the Gulf states held low-wage jobs and had high rates 
of turnover, distinguishing them from the Palestinians, Jordanians, and 
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Syrians in these countries.63 As noted above, migrants from the Maghrib 
are more likely to live in Europe than in the Arab world (or anywhere else), 
although some one million of them live in other Arab countries.64 
!e GCC states are the “migrant-importing” countries of the Arab world 
(as well as Libya pre-2011). !ey rank among the top countries globally for 
the proportion of migrants relative to their native-born populations.65 Qatar 
ranked "rst globally on the measure of percentage of its population being 
foreign-born, with 86.5 percent, followed by the United Arab Emirates, 
with seventy percent, and Kuwait, with sixty-nine percent. Ranking fourth 
and "#h are Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories with forty-six 
percent and forty-four percent foreign-born, respectively, about which I 
will say more below. Following Singapore (forty-one percent), Israel (forty 
percent), and Hong Kong (thirty-nine percent), Oman and Saudi Arabia 
round out the top ten, with 28.4 percent and 27.8 percent foreign-born, 
respectively. !is statistically signi"cant and otherwise unlikely regional 
concentration of nations with high ratios of foreign-born residents is the 
result of three inter-related phenomena: the presence of globally valued 
natural resources sealed within "xed boundaries of proclaimed national 
ownership; exclusivist states and notions of nationalism; and demographic 
dispossession and war. 
Since all Arab states grant citizenship principally through the notion of 
jus sanguinis or blood rights, and in most cases through the father’s line only 
(Yemen and Egypt are exceptions), children of migrants born on their soils 
remain foreigners, and migrants’ access to full social and political rights is 
highly limited.66 !e foreign-born in the GCC countries are o$cially de"ned 
as temporary labor migrants, a categorization that has driven most of the 
social research about them. !e high rates of “foreign-born” in Jordan and 
the occupied Palestinian territories are the result of demographic disposses-
sion and war; most of them are Palestinians—whether refugees, displaced, 
or returnees a#er being born abroad, especially following the 1990-91 Gulf 
War.67 !us, the category “foreign-born” obscures the Palestinian diaspora 
in motion, a population characterized by multiple instances of uprooting. 
!e post-1973 economic boom in the oil-rich states of the GCC beckoned 
migrants because the requisite skilled and unskilled labor was unavail-
able locally. Large numbers of Yemenis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Jordanians, 
Palestinians, and Iraqis (with smaller numbers from other Arab countries) 
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responded to this call. Together they designed, built, managed, cleaned, and 
otherwise sta!ed schools, hospitals, ports, hotels, banks, communication 
and transportation networks, and internal commercial sectors. "e #ow 
of Arab world migrants to these states doubled in the years between 1975 
and 1980.68 Some of these were family migrations while others were pre-
dominantly male migrations, varying by host country policy and national 
group. For example, Palestinians and Jordanians in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia tended to migrate as families. Yemenis and Egyptians moving to any 
GCC destination tended to migrate autonomously. A range of state policies, 
employment strategies, and economic structures, for example the kafala 
(sponsorship) system, kept these Arab world migrants in social, economic, 
and political statuses unequal to nationals. Nonetheless, whether low-wage 
unskilled workers or highly paid professionals, their incomes produced 
su$cient surpluses to enable sending remittances back home. Indeed, the 
value of remittances from Arab world migrants is higher than the value 
of regional trade.69 For example, “remittances sent to Jordan, Egypt and 
Lebanon from other Arab countries are forty to 190 per cent higher than 
trade revenues between these and other Arab countries.”70 Put another way, 
the movement of people and the capital they earn is signi%cantly greater 
than the movement of goods across the Arab world—human beings are the 
“dynamic economic factors” of the region.71 
"e Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent political align-
ments around it led to the displacement of a substantial proportion of Arab 
world migrants in GCC countries, most permanently. GCC countries have 
expelled up to one million Yemenis (from Saudi Arabia), 200,000 Jordanians 
(including of Palestinian origin) and 150,000 Palestinians, mainly from 
Kuwait, as well as Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Yemenis, and Sudanese 
from elsewhere.72 Asian migrants and nationals steadily replaced Arab 
migrants, with nationals increasingly able and willing to work in government 
positions and in occupations in which Arabic was required (such as schools, 
commerce, journalism, and media). "e proportion of migrants in the GCC 
who were from the Arab world was reduced overall to thirty-two percent 
by the early 2000s: it went from ninety-one percent (1975) to thirty-three 
percent (2004) in Saudi Arabia and eighty percent (1975) to thirty percent 
(2003) in Kuwait, and from smaller proportions to ten percent or less in 
the UAE and Oman.73 
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These demographic changes did not occur because of a shortage 
of persons in the Arab world seeking work in these countries, nor were 
they an outcome of a shortage of jobs (although the demand for labor has 
decreased since the 1990s). !ey are due to the GCC governments’ concerted 
de-Arabization policies. !ese policies shrunk the world of possibilities for 
persons from Arab states in their quests for dignity and autonomy. Consider 
that the Arab world holds both the global leaders in the category of labor 
migrant states and one of the world’s highest average regional unemploy-
ment rates.74 Youth, many of them well-educated and skilled, were the 
largest component of the more than fourteen million unemployed in the 
Arab world.75 !e IOM concluded in its 2010 World Migration Report: 
“relatively high literacy rates and youth unemployment ranging between 14 
and 50 percent, indicates that the Mashriq will remain a source of young 
migrants—a signi"cant proportion of them skilled migrants.”76 !e inverse 
relationship between migration and rebellion, and how human dignity 
stands at its pivot, could not be clearer.
GCC countries also stand out globally for having the lowest ratios of 
female to male migrants, a pattern replicated in the “Middle East”77 overall.78 
Although women have comprised nearly half of the world’s migrants for 
more than forty years,79 they make up only twenty-one percent of migrants 
in Oman, twenty-six percent in Qatar, twenty-seven percent in the United 
Arab Emirates, thirty percent each in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and thirty-
three percent in Bahrain.80 !ese asymmetrical data signal the absence of 
migrant families and the presence of highly gendered migrant social worlds 
in the GCC. A large proportion of these female migrants are recruited 
for household work based on a perception of their capacity to love and 
nurture others’ children. Most are not from the Arab world. In their quest 
to provide better lives for their own families they are forced to leave their 
children behind. !eir love is the gold they have to sell, as sociologist Arlie 
Hochschild has articulated.81 
Home to Forced Migrants and the Displaced
!e Arab world also stands out in the "eld of migration because it is the 
home to the largest number of forced migrants in the world, including both 
refugees and internally displaced people. Nearly one quarter of the world’s 
refugees lived in “the Middle East region” in 2008.82 While 7.6 percent of 
all migrants globally are refugees, they are seventy-seven percent of the 
(8.7 million) migrants living in the Mashriq.83 !e Sudan had the largest 
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number internally displaced persons, with 4.9 million in 2010, despite a 
drop of 1.1 million persons, and Iraq had the third largest (a!er Columbia), 
with 2.76 million.84 "ere are also an estimated 160,000 internally displaced 
Palestinians, and some 60,000 to 90,000 currently at risk of displacement.85 
It is indeed sobering for those who study the peoples of the Arab world to 
recognize that they constitute the largest number of refugees and displaced 
people in the world today. "e majority live in places where blocked aspira-
tions, political voicelessness, and challenges to human dignity are daily and 
salient. It is incumbent upon us to address how these challenges are similar 
to and di#erent from the challenges of being an Arab world migrant in 
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, or Latin America. 
Knowledge about Arab Migrants in Labor Migrant States
"e qualitative English-language social science literature on Arab world 
migrants living inside the Arab world is strikingly di#erent from scholar-
ship on migrants living outside of it. Studies of migrants outside of the 
Arab world have pursued with much more breadth and vigor questions 
of cultural, economic, civic, and political belonging, social integration, 
economic mobility, institutional development, material culture, leisure 
pursuits, meaning, identities and hybridities, inter-group relationships 
and solidarities, transnational ties, social class, gender, and sexualities (in 
a nascent stage)—the very anthropologies and sociologies of daily life. In 
the case of Arab world migrants living inside the region, state policies, work, 
and human rights are central foci. Certainly, when political membership is a 
priori ruled out, belonging is reserved for a select few, and social integration 
is highly bounded, these research topics may seem less provocative. Yet we 
should consider comparatively the ways in which these conditions and their 
outcomes are similar to and di#erent from those of Arab world migrants in 
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, Africa, Latin America, and 
Southeast Asia. We should give equal e#ort to understanding the ways in 
which Arab world migrants join with others to give meaning to their lives, 
no matter where they are living. Putting state policies aside, is it the case that 
Arab world migrants living within the region prefer to return home more 
than those living in Europe or the United States, where anti-Arab racism 
and Islamophobia rage? Based on our scholarship, questions of “home” are 
more prevalent and profound among Arab world migrants living in places 
where they have more fully articulated social lives and permanent residency 
149
Louise Cainkar
or citizenship. Is this really the case, and if so, why? We should endeavor 
to better spell out the similarities and di!erences between the daily life 
experiences of Arab migrants living within and outside of the Arab world, 
as well as how these inform group memberships, solidarities, meaning, and 
notions of belonging and of home. 
Questions we might ask of Arab world migrants living within the 
Arab world include: How do social and political exclusions play out in their 
everyday lives? Are there any points of inclusion, even if these are o"cially 
discouraged? What daily actions do migrants take to resist dehumanization 
and maintain their sense of dignity? Do women deploy di!erent strategies 
than men? What types of hierarchies exist among migrants? What types of 
social communities do Arab world migrants in Arab countries form, and 
how important is nationality, gender, religion, sexuality, and social class in 
these formations? What material culture and social institutions have they 
produced? How do they manifest and practice religiosity? How do they 
manage relationships with other migrant groups? What are the leisure and 
cultural pursuits of Arab migrants living in other Arab countries? What 
are their dreams? Despite their liminal status, they surely remain active 
creators and producers of culture. Addressing these and other questions 
will more fully complicate and humanize migrants living in the Arab world. 
We know these migrants in a unidimensional way as homo economicus. 
In sum, relative to our knowledge of Arab world migrants in other 
places, we know less of the complexities and depths of these migrants’ 
lives outside of that rei#ed social category of “labor migrant.” As I have 
suggested, this category more appropriately defines state policies and 
not the migrants. Similarly, we know less of the worlds of work for Arab 
migrants outside of the Arab world than we do for those within. We must 
begin with the assumption that, whether within or without the Arab world, 
the worlds of migrants whose hearts and souls are split across geographic 
and cultural spaces are equally complex. A comprehensive understanding 
of the current social conditions of Arab world migrations and diasporas 
demands that our inquiries be more internally harmonious. $ey should 
not vary by country of resettlement, nor should social categories on the 
o"cial schemata of migrants set limits on the contours of our work. When 
we resist what categories deny, we allow all Arab migrants to remain social, 
cultural, civil, and political equals.
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Global Arab World Diasporas
!e Arab world diaspora located outside of the region is roughly composed 
of some thirty to thirty-seven million people: that is nearly three times the 
total number of current Arab world migrants, ten percent of the current 
Arab world population, or the populations of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan 
combined (see map).86 If we add to this total the number of current Arab 
world migrants and second-, third-, and fourth-generation Palestinians who 
are dispersed throughout the Arab world, a rough estimate of the Arab world 
diaspora would approach forty to "#y million persons. Arab world  diasporic 
communities are numerically largest in places where native-born descend-
ants of prior migrant generations substantially outnumber current migrants. 
!is is the case among Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian communities in the 
Caribbean and Central and South America, as well as Yemenis in Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Since these diasporas are heavily composed of second-, third-, 
and fourth-generation descendants of migrants, large proportions of them are 
born into the hybridities of mixed ethnicity and/or migrant and non-migrant 
fusion. Many have never visited their diasporic homelands. !eir identi-
ties, homeland ties, movements, material cultures, literature, poetry, social, 
political, economic, and cultural institutions, even their sports teams (see 
the "lm Goal Dreams87) have been subjects of research, particularly among 
scholars of history, cultural studies, and comparative literature. !e lens of 
diaspora studies is well suited to the study of these groups, given its focus 
on the simultaneity of notions of home and away, on cultural production, 
hybridities, memory, and imagination, and the ways in which these "gure 
into de"ning and rede"ning the “we” of those communities. Transnational 
perspectives are similarly fruitful for developing our understandings of the 
circularity rather than stasis of migration, the impact of homeland on those 
abroad, of those abroad on homeland, the meanings of borders and multiple 
locations, as well as the “challenges and delights of embracing multiple 
psychic locations.”88 
Yemeni and Omani diasporas in Asia go back centuries and scholars link 
them to the early spread of Islam, with the Yemeni evolving into both trade 
and labor diasporas over time.89 By most accounts, the Levantine (Lebanese, 
Syrian, Palestinian) diasporas started modestly in the seventeenth century 
and expanded signi"cantly in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, 
and are usually tied to commercial developments. Diaspora scholar Robin 
Cohen calls them “trade diasporas” since they are built by interdependent 
networks of merchants who mediate between the cultures of buyers and 
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sellers and remain culturally distinct from the host society, somewhat akin 
to Bonacich’s concept of “middleman minorities.”90 In Cohen’s model, trade 
diasporas would no longer retain this appellation once their communities 
assimilate to the host society or cease to engage in trade, a proposition that 
appears ripe for continuing research given the broad range of the Levantine 
diaspora. Cohen considers the continuing cycle of departure and return among 
Lebanese as “virtually unprecedented in populations so widely dispersed.”91 
He notes that, “over about one-quarter of self-declared Lebanese do not live 
in Lebanon at any one time” a formula that might refer only to Lebanese-
born nationals, because the Lebanese diaspora is many times larger than the 
population in Lebanon.92 Cohen shows low and high estimates for Lebanese 
in France, Brazil, West Africa, Argentina, Australia, Canada, the Gulf/Saudi 
Arabia, and the United States. !ese estimates add up to a Lebanese diaspora 
that ranges from a low of about eight million to a high of twenty-two million.93 
!e Lebanese population in Lebanon at the time (in 1991) was about 2.9 
million.94 !e Palestinian diaspora has roots in commerce and maintains a 
commercial character in some places, but its current magnitude and regional 
concentration are the result of expulsion and dispossession caused by the 
creation of Israel and later Israeli policies.
Arab world diaspora scholars tend to study communities living outside of 
the Arab world—with the signi"cant exceptions of the Palestinian, Armenian, 
Assyrian, and Iraqi diasporas—even though migration data tell us that large 
diasporic populations live within the region. A signi"cant exception to this 
pattern is Brand’s treatment of Arab state policies, or lack thereof, vis-á-vis 
their diasporic populations.95 Diaspora studies scholars’ prominent interest 
in histories and in the linkages, attachments, meaning-making, and cultural 
products of descendant generations may explain this tendency. So, too, may 
the continued draw of pan-Arab ideas, which infer that an Arab diaspora 
cannot exist inside the Arab world, just as the notion of umma implies that 
there can be no “Muslim diaspora.” Shedding the diaspora light on the Arab 
world requires engaging painful questions around the shared and the exclusive. 
When we deconstruct the logic behind the shared and unbounded qualities of 
language, food, music, poetry, literature, and "lm, alongside the exclusivity 
of material resources that lie within arbitrarily bounded nation-states, we 
locate part of the explanation for the simultaneity of high labor demand and 
high unemployment within the Arab world. 
While the study of Arab world diasporas tends to focus on the social action 
and cultural production of multiple generations outside the “homeland,” the 
fact of multiple generations is not a requirement for deploying a diasporic 
lens. In the social sciences, diasporas are distinguished not by generations 
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but by persistent identities and social and emotional ties to a homeland,96 
and by forms of consciousness, social forms, and cultural production.97 
!ese analytic concerns could be applied to migrants from Arab countries 
living within the Arab world, whether Syrians in Kuwait, Jordanians in the 
Emirates, Egyptians in Jordan, Lebanese in Egypt, or Yemenis in Saudi Arabia, 
were we to consistently take a harder look at the ethnographies of their daily 
lives. Instead, as noted above, our dominant focus has been on work and 
government policies—such as those limiting residency, family reuni"cation, 
ownership of property, and political activity. !is focus implicitly signals an 
acceptance that “labor migrants” are somehow di#erent from other migrants 
and cannot be examined from a diasporic perspective.98 Brand has noted that 
transnational studies have “not had much impact on Middle Eastern studies.”99 
Here referring to Arab state policies toward their own diasporic populations, 
Brand notes: “If civil, economic, and political rights of the average national 
are given short shri$ on home turf, why should one expect the Arab state 
to engage in substantially di#erent behavior toward nationals abroad?”100 
As scholars, we could advance the study of Arab world diasporas by 
re"ning our understandings of how ideologies, policies, cultures, and inter-
pretations intersect to produce di#erent outcomes in di#erent places. Why 
does the Arab world diaspora in much of Latin American and the Caribbean 
look qualitatively di#erent in terms of social and political integration than it 
does in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Europe, and West 
Africa? For example, when compared to their social positions in other diasporic 
locations outside of the Arab world, the Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian 
communities in the Caribbean and Central and South America appear to 
be the most socially and politically integrated, to have the highest rates of 
intermarriage with the local population, and to have achieved the highest 
levels of political o%ce, although a comparison with, for example, Yemenis 
in Southeast Asia may reveal similar patterns.101 Do we really understand the 
ways in which Arab world diasporas in Malaysia and Indonesia are similar 
to and di#erent from those in other locations? Scholars seeking answers to 
questions not only of “what” but “why,” who want to understand process 
and causality with regard to racialization, language and culture retention, 
identities, and social and political integration, need information on the ways 
in which local and global context shape social behavior. Developing this 
understanding requires attending to policies and patterns historically and 
comparing them across time and place. Considerable research lies ahead for 
scholars in the exploration and comparison of the contours of similarity and 
di#erence situated in place, and their implications for social life across the 
wide-ranging global Arab world diaspora.
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Table 2: Estimates of the Size of Global Arab World Diasporas by Country of 
Residence, Indicating Country of Origin of Major Constituent Groups a
Compiled by Louise Cainkar
Argentina b
Lebanon and Syria
1 million – 3.5 million
Australia c
Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Syria
400,000 – 1 million
Brazil d
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine
Note: Brazil’s population of Lebanese descent may be larger 
than Lebanon’s population.
1.5 million – 12 million
Canada e




Note: Estimated fourth largest Palestinian population in the 





Europe and UK h
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen
9 million - 14 million
Honduras i
Palestine





Note: Commenced in the eleventh century

























Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq







Other signi#cant Arab world diaspora communities are 
found in Columbia, Venezuela, Cuba, the Dominican Republ
l  i r  c ities are found in Columbia, Venezuela, Cuba, the Do-
minica  Rep blic, Ecuador, Haiti, Jamaica, Trin dad and To ago, Panama,u Malaysia,v the Philippines w
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a Composed by author based on one or more scholarly, o!cial, or credible non-web English language 
sources for each country, and is non-exhaustive. Numerous web-based sources of various degrees of 
credibility may be located using search engines; they are not referenced here. "is table was composed 
using destination country and Arab country of origin as its data collection criteria. "is method of 
data collection results in the exclusion of two large diasporic groups associated with the Arab world: 
Armenians and Assyrians. Armenians are not originally from the Arab world, but have had a sig-
ni#cant presence in a number of Arab countries. Estimates of their current numbers are provided as 
follows: Russia: 2 million, US: 800,000, Georgia: 400,000, France: 250,000, the Ukraine: 150,000, Leba-
non: 150,000, Iran: 100,000, Syria: 70,000, Argentina: 60,000, Turkey: 60,000, Canada: 40,000, Austra-
lia: 30,000. See Khachig Tölöyan, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation,” Diaspora: 
A Journal of Transnational Studies 9, no. 1 (2000), 107-136. Assyrians are indigenous to parts of the 
modern day Arab world. Historic Assyria is located in an area that is in today’s Iraq, Syria, Iran, and 
Turkey. Short of reliable numbers, one can report that half of the Assyrian people live outside the 
“Middle East” with signi#cant populations living in the US, Europe (especially Scandinavia and Ger-
many) Australia, the Caucasus, Lebanon, Georgia, and Russia (see Eden Naby, “Putting Assyrians into 
Middle East Literature: Memoirs and Novels.” MESA Bulletin 41, no. 1 (2007), 37-41).
b Christina Civantos, Between Argentines and Arabs: Argentine Orientalism, Arab immigrants, and the 
Writing of Identity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); "eresa Alfaro-Velcamp, “Im-
migrant Positioning in Twentieth-Century Mexico: Middle Easterners, Foreign Citizens, and Multi-
culturalism,” Hispanic American Historical Review 86, no. 1 (2006).
c Ghazi Omar Tadmouri, Genetic Disorders in the Arab World: United Arab Emirates (Dubai: Centre 
for Arab Genomic Studies, 2004).
d John To#k Karam, Another Arabesque: Syrian-Lebanese Ethnicity in Neoliberal Brazil (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2007); Tadmouri, Genetic Disorders.
e Darcy Zabel, Arabs in the Americas: Interdisciplinary Essays on the Arab Diaspora (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2006); Ibrahim Hayani, “Arabs in Canada: Assimilation or Integration?” in Arabs in Ameri-
ca: Building a New Future, ed. Michael. W. Suleiman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), 
284-303; Colin Lindsay, !e Arab Community in Canada 2001 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada: Canada’s 
National Statistical Agency / Statistique Canada: Organisme statistique national du Canada, 2007); 
Tadmouri, Genetic Disorders.
f “"e Wandering Palestinian,” Economist, 8 May 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11332217.
g Ibid. 
h Multiple country-by-country sources are behind this cumulative #gure.
i Sharon Lopez and Katharine S. Speer, “Arabs in Honduras: Immigration, Integration, and the Pales-
tinian Presence,” in Arabs in the Americas: Interdisciplinary Essays on the Arab Diaspora, D. Zabel, ed. 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 117-132; Larry Luxner, “"e Arabs of Honduras,” Saudi Aramco World 
(2001), http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200104/the.arabs.of.honduras.htm; Nancie Gonza-
les, Dollar, Dove, and Eagle: One Hundred Years of Palestinian Migration to Honduras (University of 
Michigan Press, 2003). 
j Kazuhiro Arai, “Arabs who Traversed the Indian Ocean: "e History of the Al-Attas Family in Hadra-
mawt and Southeast Asia, c.1600-c. 1960.” Ph. D. diss, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2004; Faisal 
Darem, “Yemen & Indonesia: Ten prosperous centuries of relations,” Yemen Observer, 12 December 
2009. http://www.yobserver.com/business-and-economy/10017730.html.
k Tadmouri, Genetic Disorders; Robert Handlo$, ed., Ivory Coast: A Country Study (Washington: GPO 
for the Library of Congress, 1988), http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/.
l Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinians at the End of Year 2006 (Ramallah – Palestine, 
2006); Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, Iraqis in Jordan !eir Number and Characteristics (Amman: 
FAFO and Haskemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, 2007).
m International Labour Organization (ILO), “Palestinians in Lebanon Working but Under Precarious 
Conditions.” Press Release, 20 November 2012, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/
news/WCMS_193717/lang--en/index.htm; Jad Chaaban, Hala Ghattas, Rima Habib, Sari Hana#, Na-
dine Sahyoun, Nisreen Salti, Karin Seyfert, and Nadia Naamani, Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian 
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In Table 2, I have compiled some of the available estimates of the largest 
current Arab world diasporas by place, noting the numerically dominant 
groups in each location. As with all migrant demographics, these numbers 
should be approached prudently. !e greater the number of generations 
in diaspora, the greater the likelihood of error within and non-compara-
bility across place, since the subject being counted is not always the same. 
Considerations include whether immigrant, native-born, or third-generation 
and beyond; single or mixed parentage; citizens, dual nationals, or residents; 
self-identi"ed or attributed; Arab by ethnicity or Arab country national; and 
so on. Reported estimates for a number of countries vary widely (or wildly). 
!ese numbers, then, are most useful to gain a sense of the proportion and 
Refugees in Lebanon (Beirut: American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 2010).
n Alfaro-Velcamp, “Immigrant Positioning in Twentieth-Century Mexico: Middle Easterners, Foreign 
Citizens, and Multiculturalism.” Hispanic American Historical Review 86, no.1, 61-92.”
o Mara A. Leichtman, “Migration, War, and the Making of a Transnational Lebanese Shi’i Community 
in Senegal,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 2 (2010), 269-290, and Leichtman, 
“!e Legacy of Transnational Lives: Beyond the First Generation of Lebanese in Senegal,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 28, no. 4 (2005), 663–686;
p Lina Beydoun, “Lebanese migration to Sierra Leone: Issues of Transnationalism, Gender, Citizenship, 
and the Construction of a Globalized Identity,” ETD Collection for Wayne State University (2005). 
Paper AAI3196193. http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/dissertations/AAI3196193;
q Ameen Ali Talib, “Hadramis in Singapore,” !e British-Yemeni Society (1995),” http://www.al-bab.
com/bys/articles/talib95.htm; Farid Alatas, ed., Hadhrami Arabs Across the Indian Ocean: Contribu-
tions to Southeast Asian Economy and Society (Singapore: National Library Board, 2010).
r Angela Brittingham and G. Patricia de la Cruz, “We the People of Arab Ancestry in the United States,” 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005. www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-21.pdf; Arab American Institute, 
!e Arab Population: 2000. U.S. Census Bureau; !e Arab American Institute. http://www.aaiusa.org/
pages/demographics/.
s Phillipp Bruckmayr, “Syro-Lebanese Migration to Colombia, Venezuela and Curacão: From Mainly 
Christian to Predominantly Muslim Phenomenon,” European Journal of Economic and Political Stud-
ies 3 (2010), 151-178.
t United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Country Operations Pro"le – Yemen, 2012, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486ba6.html;
u Habeeb Salloum, “Arabs Making their Mark in Latin America: Generations of Immigrants in Colom-
bia, Venezuela and Mexico,” al-Jadid. 6, no. 30 (2000), entire issue.
v Judith Nagata, “What Is a Malay? Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a Plural Society,” Ameri-
can Ethnologist 1, no. 2 (1974), 331-350; Hussein Alatas, !e Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the 
Image of the Malays, Filipinos, and Javanese From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century and Its Func-
tion in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
w See Asian Journal of Social Science 32 no. 3 (2004), which is devoted to the Arab (mainly Yemeni, 
but also Omani and Syrian) diasporas in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and the Philippines. Estimates for 




reach of current Arab diasporas, although only the largest diasporic loca-
tions and largest groups are included in the table, excluding many others 
smaller in dimension. A worthwhile scholarly project, yet one ripe with 
substantial challenges, would consist in attempting to get a comparable 
handle on these numbers and !lling in the missing data.
Conclusion
Producing a quantitative overview of global Arab world migrations and 
diasporas is a daunting task. "ere are so many peoples, places, categories, 
and de!nitions, and so little consistency across time and place. Any attempt 
to produce a comprehensive global portrait of the far-reaching historical 
and contemporary Arab migrations and diasporas must necessarily sacri-
!ce a substantial amount of depth and detail and engage instead in broad 
generalities. As a scholar of Arab migrations and diasporas who strives for 
rigor, I am as unsatis!ed with this performance as another reader might 
be. Nonetheless, it is a necessary exercise that serves to situate the work of 
other scholars in a global context. 
If this overview highlights anything, it is the need for yet more work 
that deploys a range of scholarly paradigms while at the same time considers 
what we need to know to advance global and cross-cultural comparisons. I 
have shown that de!ning our research interests by o#cial migrant categories 
and by place has produced non-comparable bodies of literature. My inces-
sant repetition of the word “migrant”—instead of using terms like refugee, 
guest worker, contract laborer, asylee, immigrant, emigrant, family migrant, 
transnational, or diasporic subject—has been painful for a writer who prefers 
precision and invoking the passion that accompanies the meanings of these 
terms. But I have done this to make a point. By deconstructing how we have 
been looking at Arab world migrations and diasporas, I suggest that while 
place matters and immigrant type may be important, and both should be 
clearly de!ned, neither should drive our research questions. When we set 
out to discover, rather than impose, what has meaning, we enhance global, 
comparative, and cross-disciplinary conversations about what matters for 
migrants and their descendants. I have also suggested that human dignity 
is one broadly generalizable overarching concern, stated or unstated, that 
is shared in our collective body of research. We might consider stating this 
concern up front.
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Similarly, I have used the concept Arab world migrant instead of Arab 
migrant to highlight the fact that many people who are not Arab live in and 
migrant to and from the Arab world, which also hosts a number of diasporic 
communities. Overall, the Arab world receives less credit than it deserves for 
hosting, mostly harmoniously, a diverse range of peoples, including millions 
of refugees and displaced peoples. It is cosmopolitan and contrapuntal in 
its own ways.102 Similarly, some have mistaken the draw of economic and 
educational opportunities in Europe and the “countries of immigration” as 
proof of their cultural attraction or even superiority. While these features 
that allow people to act on their human capabilities, as well as political 
freedoms, may indeed be strong pull factors, their lure does not signal a 
rejection of homeland. Indeed, that abiding love is part of what continually 
draws migrants and their children back, whether physically or emotionally.
No matter how secure a migrant or diaspora community feels in its 
adopted home, the risk of collective attack or mass expulsion is always present. 
States and social movements that thrive on maintaining the otherness of 
migrants and their families frequently thwart migrants’ e!orts to maintain 
dignity. History has repeatedly shown that an original otherness, even long 
obscured, can be resurrected with passion through social constructions 
promoted by persons acting on political and economic interests. "is is the 
double-edged sword of “di!erence”; it o!ers dignity at the same time that 
it actively makes distinctions between people. "ere are also risks that war 
and con#ict will threaten the perceived safety of the new home. In the past 
two decades we have seen mass exoduses of Palestinians, Jordanians, and 
Yemenis from the Gulf states, Lebanese from Sierra Leone, Palestinians from 
Libya and Iraq, new Iraqi, Sudanese, Somali, Syrian, and Libyan diasporas 
in the making, and 15,000 Arabs and Muslims in the United States issued 
deportation orders a$er the September 11 attacks.
Migration is part of the perennial human quest for dignity and autonomy. 
It is not a simple option, nor one that is appealing or available to everyone. 
While it serves as a pressure-relieving valve, it does not resolve the funda-
mental problems of stagnant economies, elite corruption, massive foreign debt, 
inadequate development, authoritarianism, racism, inequality, hegemony, 
and lack of freedom that limit human capabilities and compel people to 
seek other options. One analyst predicted that Arab migration to Europe 
would increase due to the growing Arab “youth bulge” if Arab governments 
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did not !nd a way to “integrate youth into their development strategies.”103 
Otherwise, Aymen Zohry warned, the outcome might be “violence and civil 
war, as in Rwanda and other sub-Saharan countries.”104 Recent events in the 
Arab world have shown that there is a third way in the unstoppable human 
quest for dignity, perhaps unthinkable just a few years ago. "at third way 
is the largely non-violent, youth-led revolutions that have taken place. "ese 
mobilizations for change started in the Arab countries where unemployment 
was among the highest and then made their way to the migrant-importing 
countries of Libya and the Arab GCC, revealing an organic relationship 
among young generations across the Arab world. 
Poets and creative writers may be better at conveying the deep and 
complex social-psychological and emotional states of the migrant and 
diasporic subject. But scholars are well suited to capture the ways in which 
technology has built bridges between migrant and homeland, rendering 
the emotional rupture potentially less severe and the cultural connection 
stronger. Migrants today are less likely than in the past to have to relinquish 
physical and emotional ties to their homelands. "is is in part because com-
munication and transportation advances no longer require it, refashioning 
the meaning of yearning for home. "e possibilities of faster air travel 
and lower-cost communication between the leavers and the le# facilitate 
transnational associations, mutual visits, and circular migration—although 
some suggest that ease of communication may make physical separation 
more painful. Vonage, Magic Jack, Facebook, text messaging, YouTube, and 
Twitter, all made possible by global technological advances, have elided great 
distances and allowed migrants and their descendants greater participation 
in life “back home,” including in their struggles for human dignity and 
social justice.105 Technological changes have certainly produced other social 
transformations, both positive and negative for human dignity, which we 
have only begun to document. 
Technology has altered some of the contours, qualities, and reach of 
human migration, yet it has not altered its underlying character as a move-
ment in search of something better, especially when it feels unachievable 
where one is. Technology has also not changed the requirement of grand 
sacri!ce—being torn apart from deep human bonds, separated from the 
familiar, and socially transformed from a member (even if an alienated one) 
into a stranger—that accompanies crossing into new physical spaces and 
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social geographies. It is artists, poets, and novelists that have best articulated 
how these separations from family and community, from the intimate and 
the known, are profound emotional and social psychological ruptures. In 
the simple yet profound words of Mahmoud Darwish: “My country is not 
a suitcase. I am not a traveler; I am the lover and the land is the beloved.”106 
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